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Will it Ever be Possible to Profile the Terrorist?
by Jonathan Rae 
dentifying members of terrorist organisations and preventing them from carrying 
out successful attacks is a core component of any anti-terrorism effort. The 
fundamental task of this process is to separate the terrorist from the non-terrorist. 
The most prevalent method of attempting to achieve distinction between these two groups is  
to establish a set of psychological, socio-economic, physical, and/or racial attributes that 
mark one from the other. In other words, what does a terrorist look like, what personality 
traits do they possess and in what circumstances do they live and work? Essentially, it 
constructs a terrorist profile comprised of certain perceptible qualities with which an 
observed individual can be likened to, thus determining the probability of terroristic 
tendencies within the subject. Press describes the process of profiling, as follows:
'In a large population of individuals… governments attempt to find the rare 
malfeasor [terrorist, for example] by assigning prior probabilities to individuals, in 
some manner estimating the chance that each is a malfeasor. Societal resources for 
secondary security screening are then concentrated against individuals with the 
largest priors’[1]. 
If terrorist profiling is possible, it would be an irresistibly attractive method for countering 
terrorist attacks as it would maximise the efficiency of prophylactic resource allocation, 
increasing the likelihood of the interception of a terrorist attack. As an example, terrorist 
profiling could be used to focus assets at malfeasor populations within a crowd of lawful 
travellers at an airport terminal. Equally, if not more importantly, would be the use of 
terrorist profiling in observing parallels and similarities in the biographical records of 
terrorists and subsequently providing insight into the root causes of terrorism. By analysing 
the personal histories of terrorists, a terrorist personality is hoped to be discovered that 
signposts individuals willing to ‘commit espionage or sabotage, try to overthrow the 
government, commit terrorist acts, or otherwise engage in acts that would endanger national 
security’ [2].
The reality, however, is that terrorist profiling has not proved to be the panacean silver 
bullet against terrorism. Many explanations have been given as to the reasons why terrorist 
profiling has, so far at least, failed to deliver [3] [4] [5]. This begs the question: “Will it ever 
be possible to profile the terrorist?” Paramount to this discussion is the logic that drives 
terrorist profiling efforts; that terrorists can be identified in comparison to a societal 
population through the observation of noticeable, indicating traits and behavioural patterns. 
The three most prominent approaches to terrorist recognition employ racial-physical, 
psychopathological and socioeconomic attributes as profiling parameters. This paper will 
investigate the merits and failings of these three profiling techniques in order to determine 
whether the titular question - whether the terrorist can ever be profiled – is answerable.
“I
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Before investigating the methods of profiling terrorists, the fundamental difficulty of 
definition within the field of terrorism studies must be introduced due to the relevance of 
erecting operational boundaries in terrorist profiling. Defining the limits of the term 
“terrorism” has been an obstinate stumbling block for terrorism experts; a difficulty that has 
been evaded and confronted in equal measure by academics and other scholarly experts. 
Most troubling is the lack of definitional unanimity [6]. For terrorist profiling, in particular, 
ambiguity of the fundamental terminology has resulted in the bounds of the malfeasor to be 
imprecise. This is because without a universal meaning of terrorism, a comprehensive 
definition of terrorist is impossible. Any serious attempt to study terrorism must appreciate 
this conceptual opacity. Until the discovery of a universal definition, if one can exist, the 
efforts to further research the phenomenon must adopt working definitions in order to 
achieve some clarity of meaning. Those creating a terrorist profile must do exactly that, with 
particular detail to what actions differentiate a terrorist from a non-terrorist. Importantly, not 
all of the activities involved in terrorism are illegal, particularly those which support the 
ultimate action - the terrorist attack - through a peripheral network of terrorist sympathisers, 
such as financiers, promoters and recruiters.
Racial, Gender and Age Profiling
The crudest and most egregious method of profiling terrorists is to identify potential 
malfeasors based on racial characteristics. Implicit in racial profiling is the logic that 
individuals of a certain race are, as a general rule, more likely to commit acts of terrorism. 
In this thinking, ethnicity and alienage are viewed as adequate demographic divisions to be 
proper subjects of scrutiny. Following the 9/11 attacks, racial profiling re-emerged as a 
viable system for detecting potential terrorists and was implemented by the border security 
agencies of many countries, notably the United States. Ellman writes that, 
‘[to profile] on the basis of race and comparable factors, is both discriminatory and 
foolish. Arabs and Muslims - to name the two most obvious targets for such reactions 
today - are part of the American mainstream. Many are citizens. The vast majority… 
are altogether innocent of any connection with terrorism. Meanwhile, some people 
who are not Arabs… have apparently joined our enemies in Al Qaeda’ [7].
While it is true that the majority of current international terrorists are of Arab or Muslim 
identity, this neglects the fact that a considerable number are not. The second most lethal 
terrorist in American history, Timothy McVeigh, was a white American citizen. Also, the 
majority of terrorist attacks against the United Kingdom have been orchestrated and 
executed by predominantly white republican dissidents. To further deconstruct the cogency 
of racial profiling, international terrorist organisations have circumvented such measures by 
initiating attacks on targets thought to be outside of their expected theatre of operations, 
such as the 1972 Lod Airport massacre in Tel Aviv by the Japanese Red Army (JRA) on 
behalf of the People’s Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Clearly, relying on race 
as the salient factor for profiling a terrorist is not a practical solution for an effective 
counter-terrorist measure.
Another immutable dimension which is often employed to profile terrorists is biological 
gender. Proponents of gender profiling argue that all of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers were 
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male, as were the 21 Jemaah Islamiyah terrorists arrested in Singapore in 2002 [8]. The 
dominance of male terrorists should not be overstated. Despite having numerical superiority, 
Russell and Miller warn against using simplistic male-centric profiling; 
‘[Female terrorists] are more adept at allaying the suspicions of security personnel. 
As a result, posing as wives or mothers, they often can enter areas that would be 
restricted to males…’ [9].
Hudson writes that ‘women have played prominent roles in numerous urban terrorist 
operations in Latin America’ [10]. Notorious Latin American female terrorists include the 
Sandinista’s Dora María Téllez; Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front’s Ana María; 
Montoneros’ Norma Ester Arostito; and a large portion of the M-19 details that seized the 
Dominican Embassy in Bogotá in 1980 and the Colombian Palace of Justice in 1985. 
Hudson writes that ‘[the female terrorists during the siege of the Palace of Justice] were 
among the fiercest fighters’ [11]. The violent assault left 11 Supreme Court justices and 48 
Colombian soldiers dead, and the building ravaged by fire. Prominent female terrorists 
elsewhere include the JRA’s Fusako Shigenobu; PFLP’s Leila Khalid; the Irish Republican 
Army’s Sisters of Death; the Red Army Faction’s Gudrun Ensslin and Susanne Albrecht; 
and Baader-Meinhof’s eponymous Ulrike Meinhof. In fact, the Baader-Meinhoff Gang had 
a 60% female membership and the militant feminist group, Rote Zora, comprised entirely of 
women [12].  As with ethnicity, the use of gender as a dominant factor in terrorist profiling 
is undermined by the weight of exceptions against the generalisation. An effective terrorist 
profile must be constructed using meters that are more clearly indicative of terrorist 
behaviour and that reduce the malfeasor population to a plausible size for secondary 
screening. 
The issue of age discrimination in terrorist profiling is also an example of the failure to limit 
the filtering of a large population into a manageable group. There is no definitive age group 
that terrorists fall into. Although the majority of terrorists are in their early twenty’s, the 
average age of several terrorist groups is considerably lower [13] [14]. Hudson writes that 
the LTTE had ‘many members in the 16 to 17 year-old age level and even members who 
were preteens’ [15]. At the other extreme, the leadership hierarchies of terrorist 
organisations tend to be markedly older than the mean age. Both Osama bin Laden and 
Carlos Marighella were in their late 50’s when they were killed. The new head of al-Qaeda, 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, turned sixty last year. When the FBI’s Most Wanted Terrorists list was 
published in 2001, the average age of the 22 individuals listed was 37 years-old. In light of 
this variety, it is clear that age is a problematic measure of profiling potential terrorists. It is 
of interest to note at this point that while race, age and gender profiling in the criminal 
context - such as the routine searching of young black males by police patrols - is 
condemned as prejudiced, unconstitutional or institutionally racist, the equivalent usage in 
the terrorism context is largely overlooked by the general public. The populace’s relative 
tolerance of these unsophisticated profiling techniques - and the infringements on individual 
liberties that result from them - may be a consequence of the post-9/11 climate of fear and 
the culture of terrorist stereotyping that has emerged from it. 
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Pathological and Psychological Profiling
Unlike racial and gender discrimination, psychological profiling is widely accepted in both 
the study of criminology and as a method within law enforcement operations. There have 
been multiple attempts to transfer its apparent success from the criminal environment to the 
context of terrorism. Implicit in this approach is the belief in a causal connection between 
abnormal psychopathological behaviour and terroristic tendencies. The presence of certain 
exhibited personality traits or traumatic life experiences is believed to be suggestive of a 
propensity towards terrorism. In the criminal context, psychological profiling is used as a 
method of suspect identification, particularly in highly emotive cases involving rape 
offenders, sexual-orientated killers and serial arsonists [16]. Several psychologists have 
associated violent behavioural patterns with the presence of mental trauma, sexual 
deprivation and/or an oppressive formative atmosphere in the perpetrator’s past [17] [18] 
[19]. Adorno’s use of psychometric testing and clinical interviews of willing Holocaust 
participants concluded that there existed an ‘authoritarian personality’ that was susceptible 
to the influences of prejudicial and totalitarian directives. Lester, et al. transfer this work 
into the field of terrorism studies by attaching to Islamic terrorists such proclivities as the 
projection of internal guilt, the displacement of anger onto others, the submission to 
conventionalism, aspirations of toughness and bravado and an absence of empathy [20]. The 
work by Kagitcibasi into Islamic child raising practices is used by Lester, et al. to 
demonstrate that Middle Eastern family traditions are more likely to produce authoritarian 
personalities with recidivistic inclinations [21]. Volkan proposes that terrorists, particularly 
those that drive others to martyr themselves, had suffered psychological trauma during their 
childhoods [22]. Alternatively, Juergensmeyer suggests terrorism is a symbolic sexual 
acting-out by young males confined by religious and social suppression and who are 
attracted to the explosive nature of the terrorist act and the promise of virgins in the 
hereafter [23].
Similar studies have been conducted to psychologically profile European terrorists. In 
analysing right-wing Italian terrorism, Ferracuti and Bruno define an ‘authoritarian-
extremist personality’ characterised by pathological disturbance, ideological vacuity and a 
psychological disconnection with reality [24]. Sullwold categorises German terrorist leaders 
into two psychological profiles; the unstable, egotistic and apathetic extrovert, and the 
intolerant, paranoid and hostile neurotic [25]. Post terms the combination of logical 
reasoning and psychopathological terrorist influences as ‘terrorist psychologic’ - a system of 
warped cognition that rationalises and legitimises ‘acts [terrorists] are psychologically 
compelled to commit’ [26]. By compiling the numerous psychological studies into the 
terrorist mind, their amalgamated results produce multiple terrorist personalities, or utilise 
personality traits that are widely distributed in a population. Psychological profiling, so far, 
has failed to determine a single ‘terrorist personality’. The commonality between these 
psychological profiles is that the malfeasor is either insane or they hold a warped awareness 
of reality. This is particularly seen as the case with suicide terrorism. Kushner writes that 
Palestinian suicide bombers may be overwhelmed by a life experience which has generated 
extreme feelings of anger and hopelessness, such as the result of losing several relatives or 
close friends at the hands of Israeli security forces [27]. Salib and Rosenberger both 
hypothesise that the rationality of suicide bombers is hijacked by desperation caused by a 
perceived absence of hope, derailing them into a dependence on grandiose, paranoid 
delusions [28] [29].
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The endeavours of psychologists in profiling the terrorist have been limited to vague 
implications of irrationality and insanity. Post notes that,
‘behavioral scientists attempting to understand the psychology of individuals drawn to 
this violent political behaviour have not succeeded in identifying a unique “terrorist 
mindset”’ [30]. 
Dean states that the employment of methods based on behavioural and clinical assessments 
appear ‘to be of very limited use when applied to terrorists, as no such definitive “terrorist 
personality” has been found to exist in the scholarly literature’[31]. Dean describes 
figurative ‘road blocks’ that obstruct the success of psychological profiling in a terrorism 
context. The most prominent of these obstacles is the lack of any apparent psychological 
dysfunction in the biographical records of terrorists. There are two responses that could be 
drawn from this; firstly, that psychological profiling requires more primary data to deliver 
significant results; or, secondly, that psychological profiling is intrinsically a fruitless 
endeavour. The former conclusion is espoused by Lester, et al. who write that the absence of 
first-hand assessments result in the records of many terrorists, most patently suicide 
bombers, to draw from a process of ‘psychological autopsy’ [32]. Other scholars dismiss the 
possibility of a terrorist personality altogether.  Wilkinson states that; ‘We already know 
enough about terrorist behaviour to discount the crude hypothesis of a “terrorist personality” 
or “phenotype”’ [33]. Laqueur writes that the search for a unique ‘terrorist personality’ has 
been a futile venture [34]. The focal point of this argument is that terrorists are as likely to 
suffer from a mental illness as the population at large are - or at least to an imperceptible 
differential. Moghaddam states that; ‘Critical assessments of the available evidence suggest 
that there is little validity in explanations of terrorism that assume a high level of 
psychopathology among terrorists’ [35]. McCauley writes that;
‘[Systematic research into the biographical records of the Baader-Meinhof Gang 
conclude that they] did not differ from the comparison group of nonterrorists in any 
substantial way; in particular, the terrorists did not show higher rates of any kind of 
psychopathology’ [36].
Proponents of the normalcy of the terrorist mind depict the social environment that terrorists 
operate in. Terrorists are generally not delinquents or recluses, but thrive in an atmosphere 
of interdependence. Clark’s investigations into ETA found that its members are not socially 
marginalised or mentally disturbed; instead, they belonged to a close-knit ethnic community 
and were supported by loving families [37]. Unlike lone wolves, the terrorist group relies on 
‘mutual commitment and trust’ and ‘the cooperation between groups’, as demonstrated by 
the four 9/11 hijacking groups, which is ‘radically inconsistent with the psychopathic 
personality’ [38]. In fact, Townshend writes that terrorists are ‘disturbingly normal people’ 
and Crenshaw notes: ‘What limited data we have on individual terrorists… suggest that the 
outstanding characteristic is normality’ [39] [40]. Without the supposition of mental illness 
– a denigration due to a fundamental attribution error - psychological profiles resort to 
assigning subtler personality traits found in many sane members of the public [41]. For 
example, Post describes terrorists as ‘action-oriented, aggressive people who are stimulus-
hungry and seek excitement’, which, even if accurate, would cover a sizable demographic of 
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those in the military, security or emergency services [42]. It is now generally accepted that 
as opposed to serial killers, pyromaniacs and rapists, the terrorist mind follows rational 
decision-making and attends to a coherent political philosophy that facilitates the use of 
violence as a tool of strategic and communicative value. The motives of terrorists are 
inherently socio-political, relating to a group philosophy rather than individual psychology. 
From this perspective, terrorism is a manifestation of political militancy, albeit in an 
intentionally audacious form, and the rationality of its actions should not be considered in 
isolation from their purposes. 
Another criticism of the psychological profiling of terrorists is that the terrorist organisation, 
as with a legal enterprise, recruits many personalities in order to fulfil a diversity of 
functions. The composition of a terrorist organisation is far from homogenous, and requires 
the skills of not only hijackers and bombers, but bomb-makers, smugglers, leaders, 
disciplinarians, orators, communicators, trainers and financiers. The work undertaken by 
these roles culminates in the overall terrorist campaign. The complexity of a single terrorist 
organisation, not to mention the variety of terrorist movements as a whole, leads Hudson to 
write that; 
‘The personalities of terrorists may be as diverse as the personalities of people in any 
lawful profession. There do not appear to be any visibly detectable personality traits 
that would allow authorities to identify a terrorist’ [43].
Psychological profiling is an inadequate form of discerning between the terrorist and the 
non-terrorist due to both the diversity and normalcy of the personalities that constitute a 
terrorist organisation’s membership.
Socioeconomic Profiling
The final profiling technique which will be examined is the use of socioeconomic measures. 
This strand of terrorist profiling relies on the premise that terrorist proclivity can be 
ascertained through information on an individual’s social status, education, livelihood and 
marital status, amongst other factors. The general belief among international leaders is that 
“poverty lies at the heart of terrorism”, as purported by Desmond Tutu and South Korean 
President Kim Dae Jong, and “education reduces terrorism”, as supported by the Dalai 
Lama and Nobel Laureate Elie Wiesel [44] [45]. These blanket suppositions do not always 
correlate with real world research. An example of this incongruity can be seen in Russell 
and Miller’s analysis of eighteen different terrorist organisations and 350 individual 
terrorists active in the decade following 1966 [46]. Their research concluded that ‘[the 
observed terrorists] have been largely single males... who have some university education, if 
not a college degree’. From this, terrorists are more likely to be single, and, more 
surprisingly, they are likely have undertaken higher or further education. The same 
conclusion is drawn from the study of West German terrorists during that period; 
‘Whether having turned to terrorism as a university student or only later, most were 
provided an anarchist or Marxist world view, as well as recruited into terrorist 
operations while in the university’ [ibid.]. 
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Hudson writes that; ‘The RAF and Red Brigades were composed almost exclusively of 
disenchanted intellectuals’ [47]. Dean’s study of the thirty-six Jemaah Islamiyah terrorists 
arrested in 2001 and 2002 found that most of the members had high levels of education 
[48]. Besides a defining commonality of religion and above average education, the terrorist 
sample was socially and economically unremarkable. As with the other profiling measures, 
education does not, frustratingly for the profilers, paint a uniform portrait of a terrorist. A 
distinction can be made between the urban terrorist and the rural terrorist; the former – such 
as the Baader-Meinhof Gang, the Red Army Faction and the Red Brigades – are typically 
highly educated, whereas rural movements – such as the Armed Islamic Group, PKK and 
FARC – tend to be characterised by a poorly educated membership. Citing the works of 
Nolan and Sprinzak, Lester, et al. depict several cases of oscillating demographic 
dimensions that ‘change with time and place’ [49] [50] [51]. This shows that terrorism, in 
part at least, is concomitant to the political environment, and, therefore, it is expectable that 
as social and economic circumstances evolve, so does the composition of the terrorist 
demographic. It can be concluded that a successful attempt to profile the terrorist must 
recognise that its assessment is both ephemeral and context-specific.
Behavioural Detection
The lack of definitive success in profiling terrorists based on the dimensions of race, gender, 
age, pathology, psychology and socioeconomic factors has led to other methods of 
processing a population in order to detect malfeasors. The intention of these newer 
techniques is to avoid dimensional profiling due the already explained differences between 
terrorist movements, between roles within terrorist organisations and between the 
personalities and motives of individual terrorists. Instead, abnormalities in physiology and 
behaviour are detected by using technology and behavioural detection officers to monitor 
individuals at security points. The obvious benefit to this approach is that it requires no 
previous knowledge of the individual’s personal history. The US Transport Security 
Administration implemented the Screening of Passengers through Observation Techniques 
(SPOT) programme in 2003 to ‘identify potentially high security risk individuals by 
screening travellers for behaviours that may be indicative of stress, fear or deception’[52]. 
SPOT has met with increasing criticism for not being able to detect terrorists: There have 
been 23 occasions where terrorists have travelled through SPOT security points and no 
interceptions have been made using the technique [53]. As Meyer points out: ‘Put bluntly, 
the program has a 100% failure rate’ [54]. Many scholars are sceptical as to whether the 
observation of behavioural and micro-facial movements is scientifically proven to be able to 
determine future violent intent. Honts, et al. raise several concerns:
‘First, scientific research does not support the notion that microexpressions reliably 
betray concealed emotion… Second, whereas brief facial activity may reveal the 
purposeful manipulation of a felt emotion… the problems of interpretation of such 
manipulation renders the approach useless for practical purposes… In conclusion, the 
use of microexpressions to establish credibility is theoretically flawed and has not been 
supported by sound scientific research’ [55].  
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Unless the employment of brief behavioural observation to identify future malicious intent 
in an individual is scientifically proven, and palpable results are forthwith, SPOT and 
similar programmes will continue to be rightfully derided by critics.
Conclusions
The task of profiling the terrorist has been a long and drawn-out process that has seen a 
revival of interest in the post-9/11 era. During the seventies and eighties, many 
psychologists, sociologists, political scientists and international security academics sought 
to systematically record terrorist data in order to construct profiles organised around various 
parameters. The crudest profiles used immutable traits such as race and biological gender, 
while others endeavoured to define the terrorist through psychopathological or 
socioeconomic measurements. The initial obstacle facing all of these efforts was 
definitional, as is still the case today. This is because the fundamental terminology under 
investigation – terrorism – has not been universally defined. Working definitions employed 
by different studies vary and, therefore, the internal validity of recorded data and the 
generalised conclusions drawn from that data is considerably weakened. Regardless of this 
preliminary hindrance, the profiling of terrorists fails to result in any definitive phenotype of 
the universal terrorist. For instance, the use of racial profiling to monitor a population for 
potential international terrorists would result in a discrimination of security checks against 
Arabs, which total over 5 million people living in the United States alone. Overlooking the 
sheer size of this demographic, the fact remains that not all terrorists are Arabs. The 
implementation of racial stereotypes into terrorist profiling is not only imprecise, but has 
considerable ramifications for the individual liberty of the population being monitored. This 
has equal severity in the instances of gender and age profiling. 
The argument for psychological profiling in the context of terrorism also falls short in its 
claim that a terrorist personality or personalities exist. Although some scholars argue that 
with more primary data, psychological profiling will be substantiated as a successful 
measure, the current evidence concludes that no causal progression from mental illness to 
terroristic intention occurs. Psychological profiling is further stifled by the apparent 
normalcy and sociability of many terrorists. Ethno-nationalists, in particular, are intertwined 
into an interdependent close-knit community which requires high levels of trust and mutual 
commitment, far from the notions of psychosis or other pathological disorders. 
Psychological profiles that incorporate subtler but ubiquitous personality traits, such as 
aggression and thrill-seeking, do not provide enough specificity to be of any practical 
application to the countering of terrorism. On the other hand, socioeconomic profiles do 
display some merit in specific temporal and geographic contexts, but are soon invalidated 
due to the fluidity of the political environment and the evolving terrorist-counterterrorist 
dichotomy. Due to the need of a considerable amount of biographical data and the lack of 
longevity or generalisability, such profiles have limited practical use in combating emerging 
terrorist threats. Socioeconomic profiles succeed in demonstrating one thing - the 
multiplicity and complexity of the phenomenon of terrorism.
To succinctly answer this paper’s titular question - Will it ever be possible to profile the 
terrorist? This author believes that the usage of one-dimensional measurements to profile 
the terrorist is a futile endeavour and is likely to remain so in light of the current research. It 
may be argued that a successful terrorist profile can be created by amalgamating several 
unsuccessful one-dimensional assessments into a multi-dimensional profile. This is clearly a 
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recipe for compounding failure because, with each additional dimension added, the profile’s 
scope becomes more and more extraneous to the diverse nature of the modern international 
terrorist. As an alternative to profiling the terrorist, a more lucrative venture may be to 
transcend the individual by profiling terrorism as a process within a complex system [56] 
[57]. This perspective is particularly pertinent today in order to profile terrorism as an 
increasingly globalised phenomenon. 
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